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Abstract: Although much is made of the universalisation of ‘US-style’ jour-
nalism around the world and Chinese journalists’ shared professional values 
with counterparts in liberal-democratic countries (Zhang, 2009), the effect 
of these trends on journalism in China is yet to be fully explored. Using the 
2015 Tianjin blasts as a case study, this article investigates China Global Tel-
evision Network (CGTN) and CNN International’s coverage of the disaster. 
The empirical study finds that despite their overlapping news values, the two 
networks’ opposing ideological objectives contributed to different framings of 
the Tianjin blasts. Although CGTN, as a symbol of Chinese media’s presence 
on the world stage, has clearly travelled far from its past era of party-line 
journalism, it still hesitates to apportion responsibility to those in power. The 
authors argue that CGTN is increasingly torn by its dichotomous role as a 
credible media competing for audience attention on the world stage, and a 
vital government propaganda organ domestically. 
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COMMUNICATION scholars recognise the mass media’s capability to serve as a key channel for disseminating information about disasters (Lowrey et al., 2007; Tulloch & Zinn, 2011). Media audiences expect ac-
curate, timely, and trustworthy information to make considered decisions about 
their personal safety. In contrast, inaccurate, incomplete, or sensational news 
coverage can contribute to the public’s misunderstanding of risks (Lowrey et 
al., 2007). In an interconnected world, the proliferation of 24-hour satellite 
news channels has given viewers unprecedented choice in terms of where they 
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get their news. Different journalism styles characterised by broader political 
perspectives are collectively reshaping the global news agenda (Lavelle, 2014). 
Spearheading this shift is China, where significant investment has expanded its 
international media operations in contrast to the downsizing occurring in many 
Western countries (Cai, 2016, p. 109). 
China’s national broadcaster, China Central Television (CCTV), launched 
its English-language satellite news channel CCTV International in May 2004 
(Jirik, 2016). In April 2010, the channel was rebranded as CCTV News and 
expanded to include affiliates CCTV America and CCTV Africa (CCTV, 2010). 
Its most recent relaunch occurred on 31 December 2016, when CCTV News 
was rebranded as China Global Television Network (CGTN) to consolidate its 
worldwide reach (Associated Press, 2016) and ‘cope with the global trend in 
media convergence’ (CGTN, 2017). CGTN has a complex dual mission: to be-
come a globally credible media organisation, while sustaining its role as a vital 
government propaganda organ (Associated Press, 2016). 
CGTN is an instrument of ‘soft power’ used by the Communist Party of 
China (CPC) to advance state-led public diplomacy (Bandurski, 2017). Nye 
(2004) says ‘soft power’ is a country’s ability to influence others through intan-
gible resources such as culture, ideology, and institutions. He has argued that, 
at times, ‘soft power’ is more important than ‘hard power’ (i.e. economic and 
military prowess) in postmodern international relations. However, doubts have 
been raised over the effectiveness of Chinese media organisations as vehicles of 
‘soft power’. In studying Chinese media’s impact in South Africa, Wasserman 
(2016, p. 18) notes such organisations have struggled to win ‘hearts and minds’ 
of local audiences because state controls undermine their journalistic credibility. 
Foreign journalists have also expressed distrust and criticism toward Chinese 
counterparts, noting their reports are useful for an ‘inside view’ but mostly ‘in-
consistent with the reality in China’ (Wasserman, 2016, p. 17).
On the one hand, the rise of CGTN is seen as the realisation of former propa-
ganda chief Li Changchun’s vision in 2003 to create ‘China’s CNN’ (Jirik, 2009, 
p. 10). To this end, CGTN has succeeded in terms of optics; it shares international 
norms of satellite news production including a catchy promotional slogan (‘see 
the difference’), seemingly impartial content, and a team of reputable foreign 
newscasters (Dunbar, 2017). On the other hand, CGTN’s ‘soft-power’ influence is 
limited by its news content that prioritises party interests (Ide, 2012). CGTN staff 
have noted the channel must ‘work harder than other networks’ to build credibility 
(Powell, 2015). However, media observers argue CGTN remains ideologically 
unchanged from its predecessor CCTV News as demonstrated by its continued 
adherence to party press principles (Lopez, 2017) that reflect the ‘correct political 
direction’ and ‘correct guidance of public opinion’ (Bandurski, 2017).
Nevertheless, Chinese media remains a diverse and dynamic entity. As of July 
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2012, there were 1,918 newspapers and 2,185 television stations (Zhou, 2015, p. 
59). Globalisation of Chinese television has diversified news content and formats, 
reflected by CGTN’s programming and digital expansion. Professional norms 
have diversified, too, causing tension between market orientation and control by 
the party-state (Hong & Liu, 2015, p. 443) as more Chinese journalists base their 
reporting on ‘social responsibility’ and ‘revealing truth’ principles (Tong, 2014, 
p. 133). It is in this context we use a comparative content analysis of a breaking/
disaster news story in China to examine CCTV’s domestic news coverage and 
analyse the impact of internationalisation of the Chinese television network on 
its domestic performance where it competes with both national and international 
media such as CNN International.  We argue that CGTN is increasingly torn 
by its dichotomous role as a ‘watchdog’ in society and as a ‘guard dog’ of the 
party-state, which is intensified by its global expansion.
Reporting disasters
Disasters present significant challenges for Chinese journalists. Their respon-
sibility to promote national unity after a disaster is a legacy of Maoist disaster 
management that continues today (Paltemaa, 2016, p. 189). Tianjin is consid-
ered one of the country’s most rapidly advancing areas for industrial and finan-
cial activity, with about 285 Fortune Global 500 companies operating in the 
city’s Binhai region where the blasts occurred (Marinelli, 2015). About mid-
night on 12 August 2015, two explosions ripped through a hazardous chemical 
storage facility in Tianjin, a port city in northern China. The final death toll 
of the disaster was listed at 173, including more than 100 police officers and 
firefighters (Associated Press, 2015). The blasts were an international media 
event that caused political and social debate in China. The private company that 
owned the destroyed facility, Ruihai International Logistics, was subsequently 
found to have used its political connections to circumvent safety regulations. 
According to an offical investigation, the blasts were caused by the ignition of 
hazardous materials improperly or illegally stored at the warehouse (Xinhua, 
2016). The company’s chairman, Yu Xuewei, was given a suspended death sen-
tence for his role in the disaster, while 25 officials and 11 people employed by a 
company that issued fake licences to the company were jailed (Connor, 2016). 
Following the Tianjin blasts on 12 August 2015, the Chinese government 
continued its pattern of controlling information on traditional and social media 
(Dou, 2015). This research explores ways in which CGTN facilitated nation-
building and yet adhered to traditional journalistic values of accuracy, objectiv-
ity and public accountability (The Rundown 2012). Using a content analysis of 
two weeks’ news coverage after the event (13 to 27 August, 2015), this research 
identifies similarities and differences in CGTN and CNN International’s coverage 
of the disaster. It also explores how both channels’ shared news values were used 
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to uphold contradictory perspectives of journalists’ role in disaster reporting. This 
research compares CGTN and CNN International’s coverage of the disaster to 
examine their framing strategies. News frame analysis is a broad theoretical ap-
proach used in communication studies, particularly the study of news and journal-
ism (D’Angelo & Kuypers, 2010). By comparing the two channels’ coverage of 
the blasts, this study identifies discrepancies in terms of sources used, dominant 
frames employed, and attribution of responsibility.
Analysing CGTN and CNN International’s coverage of the Tianjin blasts 
allows us to understand how the media interprets a disaster. Considering the 
power of news framing in shaping public opinion (De Vreese, 2005), exploring 
the frames used by both channels can provide broader analysis into the different 
perspectives of Chinese and Western media, their roles as instruments of ‘soft 
power’, and the prospects of Beijing loosening press controls during events that 
affect many people.
Understanding contemporary Chinese media
Modern efforts to categorise national press systems have been guided by the 
Four Theories of the Press (Siebert, Peterson & Schramm, 1956), which pro-
vides a theoretical framework for studying the mass media system in a country 
based on the authoritarian, libertarian, Soviet-communist, and social respon-
sibility models. For the past 60 years, the Four Theories have dominated dis-
course in Western journalism education and research despite scholars drawing 
attention to their limitations in characterising Asian media systems, given the 
continent’s unrivalled audience scale and continuous transformation of their 
media’s professional and structural traits (Yin, 2008; Ostini & Fung, 2002). 
China’s media system was traditionally associated with the Soviet-communist 
model under the Four Theories, where the press is subordinate to the interests 
and functions of the state. Unlike liberal-democratic media systems, China’s 
media has historically been used to communicate official versions of reality 
(Tay & Turner, 2015, p. 30) to preserve national unity and protect the nation 
from internal and external threats (Yu, 2009). Since the Communist Party of 
China (CPC) established its rule in 1949, there has been no concept of people’s 
‘right to know’ in the context of China’s media system (Yu, 2009, p. 9). 
Since 2004, journalists at CCTV’s English-language news channel (now 
known as CGTN), like their colleagues at CCTV’s Chinese-language news 
channels, have tried to practice their watchdog function to a permissible degree 
while fulfilling their traditional duty to cooperate with authorities (Zhu, 2012, 
p. 185). The need for greater openness by holding the government to account 
during disasters became clear after a state media blackout during the 2003 SARS 
outbreak resulted in Chinese citizens turning to overseas media (Zhang, 2007). 
Since then, CCTV’s style of disaster reporting has been characterised by greater 
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openness. Its coverage (in English and Chinese) of the 2008 Wenchuan earthquake 
earned praise from the government, which observed media credibility supports 
party legitimacy through providing ‘a window into the workings of the powerful 
central leadership’ (Zhang, 2011).
Social media has rewritten disaster communication patterns in China (Dwyer 
& Xu, 2015) thus challenging traditional media to be more competitive in this 
new innovative, strategic space. A similar trend is noted by Steinhardt (2015, 
p. 119) in his study of Chinese media coverage of recent domestic protests that 
found the central authorities have gradually shifted their propaganda policy from 
a suppressive to a more proactive approach. This move has allowed internet users 
and investigative journalists to reconfigure public discourse towards protester-
sympathetic accounts. 
Watchdog journalism in modern China has been characterised ‘by gradual 
movement towards the market without seriously violating traditional norms of 
propaganda’ (Yu et al., 2000, p. 75). Despite a shift in journalism education in 
China from a Marxist theoretical foundation to a role of a ‘watchdog’ in society, 
Yu et al. (2000, p. 75) observe there is still a ‘disconnection between classroom 
teaching and real-world needs’; while ideas about investigative journalism can 
be discussed in class, its application in a practical sense is limited. This obser-
vation has been supported by Zhou (2000) who found partial implementation 
of investigative journalism in newsrooms, and by Chan (2016) who determined 
investigative journalism ‘struggles but survives’ under party-state controls. It is 
within this setting that we identify the problematic dichotomy of CGTN, spe-
cifically whether they are ‘watchdogs’ or ‘guard dogs’ of the party-state. The 
‘watchdog’ function involves critical scrutiny of the powerful by journalists 
undertaken on behalf of the citizenry (McNair, 2008, p. 239), while the ‘guard 
dog’ suggests journalists act as ‘sentries’ for those in power, especially ‘when 
external forces present a threat to local leadership’ (Donohue et al., 1995, p. 116).
Categorising China’s media system using the Four Theories of the Press is 
problematic due to the daily reality of journalism and broader national condi-
tions. Moreover, the Four Theories were proposed during the Cold War era with a 
pro-capitalist bias. This has led to a simplified, overtly negative characterisation 
of the Soviet-communist model. There are significant political and economic 
differences between contemporary China and the Soviet Union, most notably 
China’s reform and opening-up from 1978 and the influence of globalisation 
on the domestic mass media. The Four Theories discourse also overlooks prob-
lems with the libertarian model, such as concentration of media ownership. On 
the other hand, Chinese media has itself undergone significant market-driven 
transformations that have created a multitude of contradictions. Looking at 
CGTN, for example, it is operationally autonomous yet politically dependent; 
top-down state control has significantly diminished yet self-censorship at lower 
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levels remain; journalists are more professional and better qualified than in the 
past, yet they are beholden to the state (Zhu, 2012, p. 118). In this context, this 
research explores how CGTN has a significant role in bridging the gap between 
being a global media organisation and being a representative of China’s domestic 
political system.
Research methodology
This empirical study compared news coverage of the 2015 Tianjin blasts by 
CGTN (then CCTV News) and CNN International. CGTN’s mission is to cre-
ate ‘a better understanding of international events across the world, bridging 
continents, and bringing a more balanced view to global news through ‘neu-
tral, objective reporting’ (CGTN, 2017). Following its launch, President Xi 
urged CGTN to ‘make use of abundant information, with a distinct Chinese 
perspective and global vision, to tell the stories of China’ (Chinese President 
sends congratulations on founding of CGTN, 2016). Its ‘mobile-first’ strategy 
(CGTN, 2017) targets overseas audiences, who are most active on social media 
platforms (YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter) that are blocked in China (Asso-
ciated Press, 2016). By the end of 2016, CGTN content had been accessed by 
400 million users worldwide (Xinhua, 2017). Although CGTN’s ratings are not 
available, its forerunner, CCTV News, claimed to reach 85 million homes in 
more than 100 countries and regions (Nelson, 2013). 
CNN was established in 1980 as the first 24-hour news network in the US, 
launching CNN International in 1985 (CNN, 2011). In addition to its television 
broadcasts that reach more than 293 million households worldwide, its website, 
CNN.com, is one of the most visited news websites in the world (CNN, 2011). 
CNN has a chequered history in China, however, where any of its stories deemed 
sensitive to authorities are routinely ‘blacked out’ (CNN, 2008). In 2009, the anti-
CNN.com website founded by a Chinese student attracted broad support from 
nationalist sympathisers in response to perceived bias in the coverage of CNN and 
other Western media outlets of riots in Tibet the previous year (Xinhua, 2008).
It is useful to examine discrepancies in how the Tianjin blasts were framed by 
CGTN and CNN International, which despite their different cultural and politi-
cal backgrounds purport to uphold similar journalistic ethics. CGTN America’s 
director-general, Ma Jing, has emphasised the importance of ‘traditional journal-
istic values’ including ‘accuracy, objectivity, truthfulness, and public account-
ability’ (The Rundown, 2012), while CNN president Jeff Zucker has described 
his network as ‘truly fair and balanced’ compared to its competitors (Setoodeh, 
2016). Despite these common idealist values, the reality for the media in China 
is more complicated. Since President Xi assumed power in 2012, his vision for 
state media to be ‘powerful, influential, and credible’ (Li, 2017) has resulted in 
combining propaganda with news reporting. On the other hand, there is a trend 
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towards a journalism model that is underpinned by social responsibility, giving 
rise to smaller, state-owned media organisations such as SixthTone.com and 
ThePaper.cn, which cover contentious issues including government corruption 
and environmental problems (Tatlow, 2016). Despite the constraints of party-
directed and self-censorship, journalists in state media are nonetheless adept at 
‘testing the line and seizing the small window of opportunity’ to uphold their 
watchdog role (Luqiu, 2017).
In their coverage of the 2015 Tianjin blasts, CGTN and CNN International 
adopted different approaches to news production shaped by cultural, political, 
and social influences.
The two operational research questions for this study were:
1. How did CGTN frame the Tianjin blasts?
2. How did CNN International frame the Tianjin blasts?
To answer these research questions, three propositions are made:
1. The Tianjin blasts were framed differently in news stories by CGTN 
and CNN International.
2. The use of sources by CGTN and CNN International differed in their 
coverage of the Tianjin blasts.
3. CGTN and CNN International held different valences towards the na-
tional government in their coverage of the Tianjin blasts.
A mixed methodology comprising framing and content analysis was used to 
evaluate selected news stories. A quantitative content analysis was used to de-
termine frames and sources used by CGTN and CNN International in their cov-
erage, while a qualitative framing analysis was used to determine the valence. 
Valence in this article refers to how the media content reflects the government’s 
post-disaster response using the categories of positive, neutral, or negative. By 
combining these two methods, this study aims to answer the research questions 
about how news about the blasts was framed by CGTN and CNN International. 
Previous scholarship into news framing by Chinese media has identified a 
handful of frames commonly used in crisis and disaster communication. Feng et al. 
(2012) used framing theory to present a comparative analysis of how the Associated 
Press and Xinhua covered the 2008 melamine baby formula scandal in China. The 
Associated Press focused predominantly on the causes and effects of contamination 
including links to other safety issues in China, while Xinhua concentrated more 
on the government’s response to the crisis to portray authorities in a positive light. 
Analysing six Chinese newspapers’ coverage of the 2008 Wenchuan earthquake, Fu 
et al. (2012) found the mass media in China tend to be ‘more cooperative’ with au-
thorities after disasters allowing for greater coordination in official announcements, 
but noted this partnership undermines the media’s ability to serve as a ‘fourth estate’ 
(p. 83). Yuan (2013) used a framing and discourse analysis of media coverage of 
a 2010 Shanghai residential building fire, identifying the need to reconfigure the 
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traditional news paradigm to make room for a new participatory journalist model. 
These past studies tell us that in the event of a national crisis, China’s state media 
invariably places national interests above the public’s right to know. Its coverage 
tends to support the government’s version of events to suppress panic and dissent, 
while also highlighting positive aspects of the Chinese government’s post-disaster 
response. In this research, we have specifically focused on CGTN’s coverage, 
keeping in mind its mission as a global media channel that strives ‘to create a 
better understanding of international events across the world’ (CGTN, 2017). 
Data categorisation and collection
The research data from both networks was accessed via their websites, with 
stories sourced by using the keyword ‘Tianjin’ and airing dates corresponding 
to the study period (August 13, 2015 to August 27, 2015). CNN Internation-
al’s system for archiving online stories was beneficial for the coding process, 
with each story unique thus making sampling easier. By contrast, searches at 
CGTN’s website at the time (english.cctv.com) yielded multiple entries of the 
same news stories aired in different bulletins. Nevertheless, only unique sto-
ries were used in the sampling process to avoid repetition and ensure greater 
research accuracy. In total, 50 CGTN and 25 CNN International stories were 
analysed for this research.
This research uses the framing theory of mass communication, which refers 
to ‘the process through which individuals or groups make sense of their external 
environment’ (Boettcher, 2004, p. 332). In the process of newsgathering, editors 
and journalists use framing to reduce the complexity of the story and render 
meaning to audiences. According to Scheufele (1999, p. 107), audiences interpret 
and process information based on the tone of the news story. In this article, the 
‘tone’ is measured by the ‘valence’ each story holds toward the government’s 
response to the Tianjin blasts. Framing has been explored by various scholars 
and defined in various ways. Chong and Druckman (2007) note that individual 
attitudes, beliefs, and values have a major influence on our interpretation of 
events as media consumers. In addition to attitude, selection and salience are 
categorised within framing. The framing analysis is interpreted from an audience 
perspective. Chattopadhyay’s (2012) framing techniques informed this research, 
where close attention is paid to keywords, sources, and visual techniques used in 
news stories to assert particular frames. The framing analysis is guided by use of 
adjectives (positive, neutral, and negative) that provide indications of attitudes 
in addition to the credibility of sources.
Frames
The first proposition held that CGTN and CNN International would frame the 
Tianjin blasts differently in their news coverage. Based on guiding questions in 
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the code book, different frames were identified in both networks’ stories dur-
ing the two weeks’ coverage. The ‘loss’ frame emphasised the loss of property 
and lives to the disaster. Although it was most dominant for CGTN and CNN 
International in the first week of the study, by the second week there was a clear 
divergence as each network focused on different aspects of the Chinese govern-
ment’s post-disaster response. Table 1 shows that the ‘loss’ frame was dominant 
in CNN International’s coverage, while the ‘solution’ frame was most common 
for CGTN. The second most used frame was the ‘threat’ frame for CNN Inter-
national and the ‘loss’ frame for CGTN, which both accounted for 29 per cent.
In the first week after the blasts, the strong focus by both channels on the death 
toll and number of missing people contributed to the prevalence of the ‘loss’ 
frame. In the second week, the ‘solution’ and ‘responsibility’ frames became 
more common on CGTN and CNN International respectively. There were no-
ticeable discrepancies in CGTN and CNN International’s coverage of certain 
aspects of the Chinese government’s post-disaster response. For example, the 
issue of compensation for residents whose homes were destroyed was reported 
using in-studio graphics on CGTN. In contrast, CNN International used dra-
matic vision of protesting residents chanting slogans outside the Tianjin mu-
nicipality government headquarters. Moreover, one of its stories on 17 August 
2015 focused on relatives of missing firefighters storming a government press 
conference, which was not covered by CGTN.
Sound and visual effects enhanced the presence of certain frames. CNN In-
ternational frequently used grim stills of the blast zone, including burnt out cars 
and shattered glass inside homes, when introducing stories to reinforce the ‘loss’ 
frame. In its stories about the ‘heroic’ firefighters, CGTN used close-ups of faces 
and, on occasion, an emotive soundtrack to enhance the ‘human-interest’ frame. 
These examples demonstrate how both networks used human emotions and the 
appeal of ordinary people affected by the disaster to assert certain frames in their 
news stories. This is an established pattern for CGTN and CNN International in 
  Table 1: Distribution of news frames
CNN Inter-
national
Percentage 
share CGTN
Percentage 
share
Loss 19 35% 28 29%
Responsibility 9 16% 4 4%
Cause 5 9% 7 8%
Solution 5 9% 40 42%
Threat 16 29% 10 11%
Others 1 2% 6 6%
Total 55 100% 95 100%
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disaster reporting: CGTN focused on ‘heroes’ and ‘outstanding citizens’ of the 
Yushu earthquake (CCTV, 2010), while CNN’s coverage of Hurricane Katrina 
‘engaged in the emotional human aspect’ (Lynch, 2007, p. 38) to highlight the 
helplessness of victims. Categorised in ‘others’, the ‘human-interest’ frame 
was employed in several CGTN stories about Zhou Ti, a 19-year-old firefighter 
rescued from the rubble two days after the blasts. It was also identified in stories 
about volunteers distributing water and food to displaced residents.
The ‘cause’ frame was found to be low (less than 10 percent) in both net-
works’ coverage of the blasts, reflecting ambiguity and tight information control 
about what sparked the disaster. The ‘threat’ frame was less common on CGTN 
(11 per cent) compared to CNN International (29 percent), with the former em-
phasising government claims that air and water quality was within safe levels. 
By contrast, CNN International featured multiple stories about rain reacting 
with chemicals following the blast and cyanide levels being ‘356 times the safe 
limit’ at the blast site.
The ‘responsibility’ frame marked another key point of divergence bet ween 
CGTN (4 per cent) and CNN International (16 percent). In the instances it was used 
by CGTN, responsibility was attributed to warehouse managers in the industrial zone 
who had illegally stored hazardous chemicals. The State Council, China’s highest 
administrative body, led the investigation, and President Xi was quoted in CGTN 
reports saying those responsible would be ‘severely handled’. CNN International’s 
use of the ‘responsibility’ frame, however, primarily involved holding the govern-
ment to account. Its stories were accompanied by headlines and graphics including 
‘Chinese citizens demand accountability’ and ‘Residents demand compensation’. 
The ‘solution’ frame was overwhelmingly the most common frame for CGTN, 
accounting for 42 per cent of the total compared to just 9 percent for CNN Inter-
national. For CGTN, this frame was evident in coverage of relief efforts, treatment 
for hospitalised victims, containment and clean-up of chemicals, establishment of 
temporary offices for affected companies, and extra buses for workers to minimise 
commercial losses. The ‘solution’ frame identified in CNN International stories 
was in relation to the authorities’ efforts to clean up sodium cyanide, but often 
focused on the challenges and included grim commentary. The results above show 
that CNN International covered the Tianjin blasts predominantly through the 
‘loss’ and ‘threat’ frames compared to CGTN, which at first used the ‘loss’ frame 
before focusing on the ‘solution’ frame. The first proposition is thus supported by 
the results, though only partially due to both networks’ use of the ‘loss’ frame.
Sources
The second proposition held that the use of sources would be different on CGTN 
and CNN International. The five categories of primary and secondary sources 
and their use within news stories devoted to the Tianjin blasts is outlined in 
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Tables 2 and 3 respectively. Each source was coded to only one category: mili-
tary/emergency services personnel (i.e. soldiers, firefighters, medical staff); po-
litical actors (i.e. officials from the municipal and central governments); local 
residents/witnesses (i.e. people in Tianjin); experts (i.e. scientists, political/so-
cial/media commentators), and others (i.e. any source outside these categories). 
The total number of primary sources identified in news stories on CNN Inter-
national was 14 compared to 39 on CGTN. While CNN International relied 
on state media reports for key information, such as the tolls of those missing 
and killed, sources in this article refer to people who contribute to news stories 
either through interviews, studio discussions, or press briefings.
Overall CGTN used more sources in its coverage. Political actors accounted 
for the majority, appearing in 39 per cent of CGTN stories. Most sources in this 
category were local party officials who participated in daily press briefings. 
None were featured in CNN International news stories, which instead relied on 
local residents/witnesses (57 percent) far more than CGTN (5 percent). The high 
presence of local residents/witnesses in CNN International stories supports the 
dominant ‘loss’ frame in its coverage, with many stories focusing on witness 
accounts in the immediate aftermath of the disaster and then displaced residents’ 
bid for compensation for their destroyed homes. CNN International’s lack of 
access to local party officials also contributed to this framing. 
The use of military/emergency services personnel as primary and secondary 
sources was significantly higher for CGTN (both 26 percent) compared to CNN 
International (14 percent and 0 percent). As China’s national broadcaster, CGTN 
has a well-established relationship with the military in post-disaster reporting 
facilitated by positive coverage of relief efforts. As a foreign news channel criti-
cised in the past for ‘China bashing’ (Williams, 2008; Miller, 2011) and censored 
within China (Fung, 2014), CNN International’s reputation and perceived bias 
manifests mistrust with authorities. This was evident when CNN International’s 
crew was confronted by a firefighter who pushed correspondent Will Ripley and 
attempted to disassemble his camera during a live broadcast on 15 August 2015.
Among sources listed as ‘others’ who appeared in CGTN stories were a 
warehouse manager, factory worker, volunteer relief assistant, and company 
employee. On CNN International, experts included chemical scientists, health 
professionals, finance analysts, and a Chinese journalist who discussed social 
media communication patterns and censorship. It can be concluded from these 
findings that the prominence of authorities (both military and government of-
ficials) as sources on CGTN highlighted the positive aspects of the Chinese 
government’s post-disaster response, while CNN International’s reliance on local 
residents highlighted their personal grievances and demands for compensation.
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Valence
Proposition 3 predicted that different valences toward the Chinese govern-
ment’s post-disaster response would be conveyed in stories on CGTN and CNN 
International. Data from Table 4 supports this proposition, with nearly half of 
news stories on CNN International having a negative valence (48 percent) com-
pared to a positive valence (52 percent) on CGTN. However, both networks 
also had similarly significant proportion of stories with a neutral valance: CNN 
International had 44 percent compared to 42 percent for CGTN.
There were some exceptions in both networks’ dominant valences. Two 
news stories by CNN International had a positive valence. On 17 August, 2015, 
  Table 2: Distribution of primary sources
CNN Inter-
national
Percentage of 
total sources CCTV News
Percentage of 
total sources
Military/emergency 
services personnel 2 14% 10 26%
Political actors 0 0% 15 39%
Local residents/witnesses 8 57% 2 5%
Experts 4 29% 8 20%
Others 0 0% 4 10%
Total 14 100% 39 100%
  Table 3: Distribution of secondary sources
CNN Interna-
tional
Percentage of 
total sources CCTV News
Percentage of 
total sources
Military/emergency 
services personnel 0 0% 6 26%
Political actors 1 25% 9 38%
Local residents/witnesses 3 75% 2 9%
Experts 0 0% 4 18%
Others 0 0% 2 9%
Total 4 100% 23 100%
  Table 3: Distribution of valence
Positive Percent Nega-tive Percent Neutral Percent Total
CNN International 2 8% 12 48% 11 44% 25
CCTV News 26 52% 3 6% 21 42% 50
Note: Chinese government’s post-disaster response.
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a story was aired about a firefighter’s survival and the efforts of his comrade, 
while two days earlier another story emphasised the swift, organised response by 
authorities to rescue people. Notably, CGTN America featured stories that high-
lighted the toxic threat of chemicals following rain and cost of losses. However, 
negative elements of these stories were either minimised or neglected entirely 
in broadcasts from Beijing. CNN International drew attention to the censorship 
and lack of transparency from officials in disclosing information to the public 
following the disaster, which contributed to the negative valence in some stories. 
Proposition 3 is thus supported by this study’s results.
Discussion
The purpose of this article was to examine the similarities and differences in 
frame usage by two satellite television networks, China’s state-run CGTN and 
US-based CNN International, in covering the Tianjin blasts in the two weeks 
after the disaster (13 to 27 August, 2015). Contrary to some public discourse 
that suggests there is inherent bias for or against China by CGTN and CNN 
International, a key finding of this study was the prevailing ‘neutral’ valence 
exhibited by both networks in their coverage of the disaster: 42 percent for 
CGTN and 44 percent for CNN International. Both networks also shared simi-
lar framing patterns in the first week after the blasts, concentrating on the loss 
of lives and property before focusing on other elements, such as solutions to 
the disaster (CGTN) and, threats and responsibility (CNN International).The 
use of sources in stories significantly influenced these frames. CGTN continued 
its established pattern of relying on military and party officials to communicate 
information after a disaster. 
There is a dominant perception of Chinese media as a repressed entity in 
which constraints on journalists are greater under Xi. Proponents of this view 
point to China’s lowly press freedom ranking (Reporters Without Borders, 2017), 
wider crackdown on civil society, and exodus of young journalists from their 
profession (Phillips, 2016). In contrast, the ‘US-style’ journalism, characterised 
by CNN, has reaffirmed its importance supporting the function of democracy, 
particularly in reaction to attempts under the Trump administration to delegitimise 
it as ‘fake news’ (Jones, 2017). However, the reality is not as black-and-white 
as indicated by CGTN and CNN International’s reporting of the Tianjin blasts. 
Amid its newest stage of transition, CGTN is groping for a fine balance between 
fulfilling traditional party objectives and achieving recognition for objective 
reporting. In their study of CGTN’s operations in Africa, Gagliardone & Pál 
observed the pursuit of ‘freer’ reporting by journalists across the continent to 
match the standards of competitors including BBC and Al Jazeera regarded as 
standarbearers of ‘quality journalism’ (p. 1055, 2017). Although this trend has 
not yet been replicated by Chinese media at the domestic market, dismissing 
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such a prospect offhandedly neglects the political and professional complexities 
at CGTN shaping its current direction.
In examining popular protests in China under President Hu Jintao (2003-
13), Steinhardt (2015, p. 124) found that the central government calibrated its 
propaganda controls by signalling sympathy with aggrieved citizens and openly 
criticising local officials. The central government also pushed for ‘the develop-
ment of new and more proactive propaganda tools’ (Steinhardt, 2015, p. 123) 
during this period. In the words of President Hu, this strategy aimed to ‘turn the 
party-state into the primary definer [of reality] in a media world where simple 
suppression no longer works’ (Zhao, 2008, p. 39). In analysing CGTN’s coverage 
of the Tianjin blasts, we can see how it fulfilled a ‘guard-dog’ function by facili-
tating the party-state’s definition of ‘reality’ after the disaster. Despite censorship 
of the social media (Dou, 2015) and explicit directives that only ‘authoritative 
information’ from state media be used in reporting (Han, 2015), the central gov-
ernment engaged in what Brady (2015) describes as ‘positive propaganda’ in line 
with President Xi’s new-type media strategy. In signalling sympathy, Premier Li 
Keqiang consoled blast victims’ families and urged a transparent investigation 
(Shepherd, 2015) in remarks after the blasts.
Theoretically, this article suggests that contemporary Chinese media, par-
ticularly CGTN, are balancing multiple priorities and objectives. As the global 
arm of CCTV, CGTN imitates the characteristics of counterparts functioning in 
more liberal media environments, yet it remains constrained by development-
oriented media goals where national interest is paramount. Disasters inevitably 
create a conflict for Chinese media in managing public and party interests. For 
CGTN, the 2015 Tianjin blasts presented challenges in giving a voice to those 
affected while adhering to the ‘correct political direction’. Economic reforms 
over the past 40 years have driven commercialisation of China’s media system, 
which today is influenced both by the party-state and the market system (Meng 
& Rantanen, 2015). CGTN’s global outreach means it has the additional respon-
sibility of maintaining credibility in the eyes of its international audiences while 
satisfying government’s demands and Chinese viewers’ expectations at home.
Conclusion
This article aimed to contribute a nuanced perspective in understanding the 
modernisation of China’s media through the lens of disaster reporting. As an 
organ of the state, CGTN supports national interests as determined by the gov-
ernment. Its capacity to serve as ‘watchdog’ in society inevitably comes second 
to its duties as a ‘guard dog’ for the party-state, especially following a disaster 
when threats to social order and stability are heightened. 
CGTN understands that it needs to be taken seriously to effectively compete 
with progressive, ‘unbiased’ international networks. This realisation has allowed 
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excellent journalism to flourish in patches, recognised through award-winning 
news features and documentaries. Despite its overall terse reports after the 2015 
Tianjin blasts, CGTN’s coverage of the disaster included well-informed analysis 
that explored angles neglected by CNN International and other Western media. It 
is easy to attribute this deeper coverage to the advantages CGTN has in covering 
a domestic crisis, where the network is reporting on home soil free of obstacles 
that normally hinder foreign media; it has a monopoly on and unrivalled access 
to official sources; and it has superior resources (four journalists can cover far 
more than one). 
While no reliable data is available on Chinese viewers’ satisfaction level 
with CGTN, studies have found the government enjoys high levels of popular 
support from Chinese citizens (Laiwani & Winter-Levy, 2016). We can only as-
sume that a majority of Chinese audiences of CGTN are reasonably content with 
the channel’s current journalism style and its function in society. Jirik (2008) 
laments that whenever a piece of research about media in China is presented, 
the implied norm against which that medium is measured and usually found 
wanting is the Western press model. This article attempts to challenge this norm 
by drawing attention to the ideological objectives of the Western press model 
and highlighting the constructive and complex role CGTN strives to fulfil as a 
nation-builder; as a ‘soft-power’ instrument, and as an alternative news source 
trying to fulfil often contradictory functions as a ‘watchdog’ and ‘guard dog’.
In exploring a new paradigm of press theories, Yin (2008) argues that 
Confucianism, especially the idea that the government is supposed to take care 
of people (p. 45), was more influential on China’s mass media than principles 
in the Four Theories’ Soviet-communist model. As an international instrument 
of ‘soft power’ with growing influence, CGTN occupies a unique space in the 
spectrum of Chinese media. It targets a global audience and has led the Chinese 
media’s push to be a ‘digital-first’ news source, yet at the same time its reporting 
operates within strict boundaries. Its ability to set the agenda, as demonstrated 
by its coverage of the Tianjin blasts, reflects its growing influence domestically 
and internationally. Further, the dichotomy of Marxist press principles and jour-
nalistic values, such as balance and objectivity, does not imply that there are 
no overlapping areas between the Chinese and Western media models. During 
disasters, there is an expectation from the public for exceptional journalism to 
help people understand what is happening (Steffens, 2012, p. 8), and both the 
government and media share a common goal to mitigate societal damage (Vultee 
& Wilkins, 2012, p. 12). 
The 2015 Tianjin blasts highlighted that disaster communication is not a zero-
sum game for the Chinese government. Through its reporting, CGTN successfully 
served as the agenda setters of the government’s emergency response. It fulfilled 
its mission to ‘report news from a Chinese perspective’ (CGTN, 2017) by serving 
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its traditional mouthpiece role and adhering to party press principles. It remains 
questionable, however, if its commitment to ‘neutral, objective reporting’ (CGTN, 
2017) stands up to scrutiny in the eyes of international audiences. Despite both 
CGTN and CNN International registering more than 40 percent of stories with 
a ‘neutral’ valence, CGTN’s reluctance to focus on aggrieved residents or ap-
portion responsibility to the government undermined its ability to meaningfully 
bring ‘a more balanced view to global news reporting’ (CGTN, 2017).
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